Sunday, October 12, 2008

Legal Theory and Cosmopolitanism: Identity and Its Discontents

“And when one day our human kind becomes full-grown, it will not define itself as the sum total of the whole world's inhabitants, but as the infinite unity of their mutual needs.”
- Jean-Paul Sartre

The philosophy that led sociologist C. Wright Mills to his many insights of American life in the first half of the 20th century was arguably his belief in the Sociological Imagination.—The practice of tying the individual experience with institutions and a focus on the relationship between biography and history to bring about a fuller understanding of the individual and/or the society which she is a part of. To be sure, this notion of attaching the concept of empathy to distant individuals to bring about organic understanding is not particularly new, though perhaps forgotten in our times of curious contradiction.

Historian Lynn Hunt argues that the epistolary advent of the novel in the 18th century had physical effects (citing Richardson’s Pamela and Clarissa and Rousseau’s Julie) which created new concepts on the organization of social and political life. It is with these broadening feelings of empathy that feelings or rights in our time have grown to become largely “self-evident.” Prior to the beginning of the epistolary novel, Dr. Hunt argues, attention hadn’t been focused on how individual minds understand and reshape social and cultural contexts.

Reaching further back still, Roman Emperor Marcus Aurelius, last of the “five good emperors”, starts his Meditations (originally written as entries in a personal notebook) by listing all the people whom he learned something worthwhile from: “From my father I observed mildness of temper and unchangeable resolution in the things which he had determined after due deliberation….” Above all, perhaps, Aurelius’ Mediations are replete with the finite nature of human life and the infinite nature of the universe. When one realizes this cosmology, Aurelius argues that the proper course one should take is the labor to common interest and to value everything with just reference to the whole. Since his death in 180 AD, the Meditations have been read and have influenced millions of people including Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao.

I briefly cite these examples (with an admitted bias to Marcus Aurelius) to show that examining the relationship between the individual and society has brought tremendous insight and principles of advancement through human history—particularly in the rights and privileges we all know and experience on some level today. In many ways, our Arts and Humanities education is directed to studying or at least developing concepts which enable us to think about others. Our economy, as we are seeing, is inextricably tied to those of other countries as we share in the weal and woe of development, coexistence, and stability.

There is much to be said about this concept of empathy and the recognition of the dynamic biographical history of individuals in relation to the socio-cultural contexts in which they live—particularly if there have been instances overtime that have led to a leveling of society which benefits all. In attempts not to lineate the many facets and forms of empathy that exist, there are institutions such as the legal and its schools of thought that arguably, in their attempts to discern by ascribing a theoretical equality of all individuals, disregard or singularize the individual experience in relation to socio-cultural history. In order to further carry my position, I will be citing Eric A. Posner’s essay analyzing Boumediene v. Bush, “Boumediene and the Uncertain March of Judicial Cosmopolitanism.”

In Boumediene v. Bush, the Supreme Court held that noncitizens detained at Guantanamo Bay have the constitutional privilege of habeas corpus and that the review procedures established by the Detainee Treatment Act do not provide a sufficient substitute for habeas corpus. Posner argues that Justice Kennedy’s opinion (which he wrote for the majority) is largely due to a commitment to protecting the interests of noncitizens overseas—a commitment he calls “judicial cosmopolitanism.” Posner’s conclusion and critique of Justice Kennedy rests on the idea of an American political community of which people outside are denied certain rights. This harkens back to a disagreement I have with many ideal theorists (mainly Rawls) whose conception of a political community rests on a closed state that one is born into and can never leave. Furthermore, he cites logistic difficulties in granting habeas corpus rights dealing with cost, difficulty, and a dangerous setting for the military to comply with requirements of a habeas hearing.

Posner argues that Justice Kennedy places all weight on the logistical concern and perhaps none on the political community concern. While the case against a logistics argument is admittedly weak as stated by Posner (since Guantanamo Bay is about 500 miles away from Florida), Justice Kennedy notes that the habeas court will give deference to the government where deference is justified and the argument that habeas hearings are logistically unreasonable is, until experience proves otherwise, foreclosed. Posner then further criticizes Kennedy for not taking the “natural” assumption that “nonresident aliens just don’t have the rights Americans have.” Which almost begs the question, just what is an “American right” and what makes it so exclusive that all should not possess them if our goal in the legal system is to distinguish truth and fairness from fallacy—particularly in a time where crimes are committed against America are coming from those all over the world?

His conclusion for Justice Kennedy’s reasoning?

…Justice Kennedy is a Cosmopolitan.

Here, by Posner, and taken in a similar route by Rawls and others, we have the curious avenues one can take to articulate theories of justice. By taking the identity of an individual and her place in society and either disregarding it and placing them in an either/or situation so long as rights are concerned, as Posner does, or singularizing them (as with Rawls) by limiting the individual to a closed society and only able to belong to that community, we have curious makings of a habit of unwillingness to deal with human complexity. If we are to uphold a just and fair legal system in a post 9/11 world where even our presidential candidates are being called terrorists by fellow citizens, while our government sends billions for oil to many people who would do us harm, and where labeling carries a certain disregard for and singularizes identity. It is becoming clear in more ways than one that our current conceptions of human ecology and identity may not serve us justly for the future.

1 comment:

Fugitive Professor said...

Fascinating. But I wonder what the possible differences are between a Marcus Aurelius and Rousseau, especially given Lynn Hunt's work. Aurelius did not have the advantage of sentimental literature or psychological connection (according to Hunt). Are we reading a kind of cosmopolitanism into Aurelius?

To fast forward to Posner, his reasoning is bad because he ignores the legal reasoning of Kennedy, which is not based on judicial cosmopolitanism at all, but rather on the privileged position of habeas corpus as palladium of all other rights. But, at least at first glance, I don't find his defense of an Austinian positivism convincing either.