Fairness, Foulness, the Formalist/Realist Split and the . . . NBA

Was it a foul? With two seconds and change on the clock Tuesday night last, the San Antonio Spurs had one shot to tie the game or go ahead on an upcourt inbounds. The ball ended up in Brent Barry's hands, he attempted a pass, pulled up and--after getting L.A. Lakers' guard Derek Fisher into the air, drew contact and heaved up a three point prayer that went nowhere near the basket.

Was it a foul? Fish clearly bumped Barry on the shooting arm while he was in the process of trying to dribble out of coverage to either make the pass or put up a three. But not only was there no whistle, but not even the Spurs afterwards said a foul should have been called. If Brent Barry--who initially threw up his hands in frustration--says there was no foul, why should we think there was one? Perhaps because the league office has now reviewed the play and said there should have been a foul called.

There are four major arguments at play in the ongoing debate on whether the Lakers escaped fate on Tuesday. Interestingly, these arguments parallel problems faced by judges when tricky issues come before them. Briefly, here are the arguments:


1) It WAS a foul. A defensive player who has left his feet is out of position, Fisher had done so, collided with Barry, and it would be a foul at any time during the game. The game should be refereed the same from minute one to minute forty-eight.

2) NO foul. In a last possession play at the end of a game (especially one so momentous) shooters shoot and defenders defend and the players, not the referees, will decide the game.

3) FOUL, but it would be FOUL TO CALL IT. The Lakers had just lost possession on the other end because of a miss-call by the referees. This occurred when a shot by Fisher glanced off the rim, but the shot clock was not reset. Thus, advantage Spurs. Now, at the other end, a non-call on the foul makes it even (rather than giving the advantage to the Lakers).

4) It's BARRY'S FAULT. Brent Barry didn't sell the foul. If he sold the foul, he would have got the call. But he didn't. Barry's problem.

We can find in these arguments major schools of adjudication, believe it or not. Position 1 is akin to FORMALISM. A foul is a foul, no matter where it occurs. The rulebook tells you what a foul is. It's akin to stepping out of bounds. If a player steps out of bounds, then he turns the ball over. Doesn't matter when it happens.

Position 2 is the REALIST response to formalists. Of course rules are rules, say the realists, but the truth of the matter is that they are applied subjectively and within other, informal rules. For instance, everyone knows that superstars get calls that role players don't. And everyone knows that in the final seconds of the game, you don't try to draw offensive or defensive fouls because the referees will let you play. Few Bulls fans (or Jazz fans, for that matter) will forget Michael Jordan's famous shot in game six of the 1998 Finals (Bulls led the series 3-2 at that point). Down 85-86, Jordan cleared Byron Russell out of his way before taking the shot that put the Bulls ahead. Should a foul have been called? No, say the realists. Do we want our memory of NBA great games to be people standing on the line shooting free throws to end a game, or letting people put up shots and live or die in the moment? Let's be real.

Positions 3 and 4 are both outliers to the formalist/realist debate suggesting ways in which real circumstances mitigate the absolute rules. Position 3 takes an EQUITABLE approach. Make up calls are, after all, a part of any sport, and moreso for basketball where fouls are acknowledged as the most subjective part of refereeing. Position 4 is something akin to blame the victim. The real point, though, is not that Barry should be criticized for not "selling" the foul, but rather that if Barry had gone tumbling head over toe and lost the ball out of bounds after Fish bumped him, the referees would have had no choice but to call the foul (or, at least, it would be harder for them to ignore it).

Being more a realist than a formalist, I think the refs got it right. And I don't think the Spurs are served well by the league patting them on the shoulder and saying "sorry, guys, Barry should have been on the line to send the game into overtime." The Spurs evidently don't either, but they may just be keeping a good face. No one wants to be seen as a whiner. And, regardless of what OUGHT to have happened, what IS happening is that the Spurs have to win three in a row, with or without the benefit of good calls, informal rules, and all that jazz.

The Ethics of Tolerance

I. Hume’s Problem (Now Sen. Clinton’s): The Is/Ought Problem

No doubt that many have heard the recent comments Sen. Clinton made connecting the length of the Democratic Primaries, former pres. Clinton, and the assassination of Robert Kennedy to the month of June. The general argument Sen. Clinton attempted to make was that compared to previous democratic primaries, the contest we are all witnessing is not as long. This is not quite true. By June of 1992, former pres. Clinton did get the nomination, but (this is according to Tim Russert and others) in the six weeks prior to, a vast majority in the Democratic Party were ceding the nomination to him simply because he had a massive delegate lead insurmountable by the upcoming contests. In June of 1968, Robert Kennedy was not in the same position as former pres. Clinton to clinch the nomination. He was actually looking forward to going to Chicago and focusing on later primaries, and we all know what tragically happened next.

What is troubling about Sen. Clinton’s premises is at least threefold:

1. The way Sen. Clinton juxtaposed her reasoning for continuing on was, arguably, rather parsimonious.
2. The facts of the events Sen. Clinton cited were not fully articulated.
3. Referencing Robert Kennedy in June of 1968, and particularly only mentioning his assassination which Sen. Clinton did, as rationale, neglects America’s original political sin and arguably takes a matter of instantiated historical fact and sentiment and attempts to place it in an objective realm of reason.

The basis of premise three is perhaps most important because it references an age-old philosophical problem that poked at David Hume for quite some time. The question, then, becomes how do you make something that “is” what “ought” to be? In other words, how does/can the instantiated fact of Robert Kennedy’s assassination (the ‘is’), become part of the acceptable rationale to Sen. Clinton continuing her campaign (a rationale for what ‘ought’ to be a reason for her continued campaign)? Perhaps such an argument could be better held in favor of Sen. Clinton if she would have considered premise two more properly. For our discussion though, we shall move on the words that were spoken.

II. The Vagueness of Identity

I’ve spoken to about a handful of people about this matter; all varying in age, ethnicity, class, and training. And though it is difficult to place the thoughts and feelings of a few as complete and total rationales, I did notice connections between the opinions in conversations held and certain views of identity my friends have about themselves. Perhaps these views on identity could be used as a connective tool to interpret why varied opinions were held on this issue and just what could be done with those sentiments to not further any divides. Anyhow, concerning identity, there appears at least thus far in my studies two prisms which it can be shaped. One concerns the picture of romanticism—the idea of “finding,” or “authenticating” oneself. The other suggests a more existentialist picture (shout out to John Paul Sartre)—the doctrine of “existence precedes essence”: meaning that one exists first and has to decide what exactly to exist as. In other words, we have certain materials available to us as far as identity goes. We then have to sift through the material and construct ourselves.

A middle view could be argued, as Kwame Anthony Appiah does that self-authorship is a good thing, but that authored identity must make some sense. And for that to happen, that identity must be constructed in response to facts outside oneself. These three positions could be further elucidated if we consider the period after the Civil War and more particularly what are known as the “Civil War Amendments.” We could make the argument that the 13th, 14th, and 15th amendments gave former slaves new “materials” (even though they faced a rather austere American society—which is an issue of sociability) to construct identities with—to give them an essence consisting of citizenship, due process, etc. In the passing of these amendments, those in congress had the opportunity and venues to not only exercise a sense of moral justice, but to “authenticate“ the ideals of America. The middle view would suggest that both extremes essentially came together to make sense for all involved and are constructed in response to certain facts (the Constitution, Declaration of Independence, The Bill of Rights or the very amendments themselves). So how does this relate to how we respond to Sen. Clinton?

I argue, especially given the historical connections of the assassination of popular political leaders such as Robert Kennedy, Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. and Malcolm X, The nature of Sen. Obama being in a position to win the Democratic Party nomination and his being a popular political leader, and those who gravitate either by inclination or generous thought to either of the mentioned venues of identity, could arrive at varied interpretations of Sen. Clinton’s words. Interpretations which arguably include the understanding of the other views based on the roads of identity we’ve discussed which implies a notion of toleration for those that oppose one that someone may hold.

III. The Difficulty of Tolerance

With all we’ve discussed, it may seem more acceptable (I would hope so at least) that we may understand why it is that differences of opinion occur among people that come across the same thing or hear the same words. Outside logical connections and philosophical inquiry, resulting explanations and perhaps larger elements of truth are assaulted by unclear biases and peculiar norms. Bias is unfortunately real and so are the social norms that can emerge from them. It was on this notion that Victor Hugo rather accurately wrote “The human soul has still greater need of the ideal than of the real. It is by the real that we exist; it is by the ideal that we live” in his famous Hunchback of Notre Dame. So why then do we or should we value tolerance—especially since it can further another’s biases and make what is rather false very real? Harvard’s T.M. Scanlon argues that tolerance allows for a relation with one’s fellow citizens. Whether this relation is positive or abortive is still unclear, but in evaluating comments like the ones made my Sen. Clinton, one should perhaps realize that they are not made in objective vacuums and are attributable to not only goal-oriented biases and the training of authenticated or authored identity (or a mixture of the two), but are curiously enough, evaluated by the same means.

Dum vivimus, vivamus.