It is to John Locke whom we owe modern conceptions of “dignity” (http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/states/nc05.htm). Locke essentially conceptualizes it as an enabler for someone to hold special standing and/or an entitlement to respect. Nowadays it seems that everyone is in possession of this “enabler”; you get it just by being born, by simply showing up. This dignity that is widespread among humanity, once only ascribed to landed nobility—negating the plebian, serf, servant and slave, is perhaps one of the driving forces of liberalism today. Couple this notion (and Protestantism) with Immanuel Kant’s first articulation of the philosophical concept of Autonomy and we begin to see how liberalism is a peculiar creature of the west.
One cannot accurately engage liberalism without coming to a realization that implies an inherent pluralism in terms of human flourishing. In other words, a liberal perspective on life is conceptually an autonomous one—one that gives ample recognition and encouragement to personal development as one sees fit under the assumption that there will be equal recognition (because of inherent dignity) for everyone’s ability to also do the same so long as one’s own personal development does not encroach on the ability of another to also flourish. This liberal abstraction meets certain bulwarks as we begin to consider the institution of the public school, and dynamics of identity.
This Liberal idea of autonomous identity can be cause of political strife if we consider the debate over what should be taught in schools regarding identity claims and the seeming acceptance or recognition of some, and not others—Christian let’s say and not lesbian and gay. Again, this liberal idea of identity has resulted in substantial national and ethnic political debate over just what the truth is and at times resulting on a turn on the liberal state’s premise of acknowledging a person’s identity and protecting each person’s ability to flourish. Conflicting claims to identity-flourishing are not easily solvable by experts or ad hoc committees,-- and when considering claims of morality, which arguably lead to notions of identity, there aren’t any experts or supreme authorities to settle these moral arguments once and for all (take the debate on evolution and intelligent design for example and the gradation of opinions therein).
So, then, with these often conflicting metaphysical projections in the liberal state, educating children in many ways requires preparing them for an autonomous relationship with the dignity and autonomy of others. Because one, we as humans are not capable of developing on our own. Two, we are inextricably tied to others via relationships (parents, friends, lovers, family, children, neighbors, etc.). And perhaps third, because the things we come to value that concern the arts, the culture, money, food from other places, depend on the network of society. To be sure, we should not assume that the school has the primary role in educating children—we can rightly assume that parents have the central role. While it is true that the state may disagree with parents on how to teach children, the parents do not lose their roles. The state, in my own and the view of other philosophers, should intervene to protect the child’s growth into autonomy by promoting the notion of choices among options so that one, the child is aware of the choices of others by virtue of their equal dignity and autonomy, and two, the child’s parents still have the role of primary instruction when it comes to raising their children, and three, for the child to make the decisions that would lead her into autonomy.
Another problem then occurs if we accept this notion of choices among options within the school setting. How does this doctrine, then, suggest proper pedagogical methodology? In particular, if we hold true to the choices among options doctrine, we then should not omit some options. In the West, we have a peculiar way of asserting Euro-influenced methodologies essentially negating the other options other groups of people have come to raise and educate their children. For example, Harvard Economics Professor, Roland Fryer mentioned recently on CNN’s Black in America that African-American students perform lower than children in third-world countries. In many ways we could argue that all the options aren’t being afforded to children via routes to autonomy because those options have been restricted to a Euro-American sensibilities and politics of pedagogy while giving arguably proper avenue to place some responsibility on parents (or the lack thereof) which may lead to other critical forces causing such disparity. How, then, should the liberal state decide on a curriculum teleologically aimed at autonomy? Better yet, how can the liberal stat ensure it?
There is immediately the problem of what we can all agree the truth is (take religious education which preaches certain things about homosexuality and abortion). There is also the conflict of how much weight to place on different topics often among the same topic. Consider what I call the Lincoln paradox: In American history, just how much focus should be placed, pedagogically, to his decision to emancipate the slaves? Lincoln is generally depicted as a pariah of social justice given his time, but of what mention is equally often given of the political benefits of the emancipation for Union forces and of how he did not view blacks as equal to whites? The issue is not what the facts are, but which ones we should focus on as we teach children about events, ideas, and subjectivities—not just what happened, but what narratives those lessons are wed in. Kwame Anthony Appiah argues that since children are not readily able to absorb truth in all of its complexity, we must begin with simplified truths and perhaps what is even untrue. For example, we are taught untruth when we learn physics: We learn Newton and Maxwell before we learn Einstein and Schrödinger. Newton and Maxwell, he says did not know about relativity or about interdeterminancy of fundamental physical laws and so their physics which assumes absolute space and infinite divisibility is just not true. Perhaps this argument does not hold as much water when we move from concrete mathematical principles to the subjectivities of the mind, but maybe there is something to it all.
This “subjectivity problem” in education is highly critical because subjectivity arises generally from some interaction with the world (or lack thereof) and there are notions of intersubjectivity as noted by Sartre and also W.E.B. Du Bois’ thesis of double consciousness which unquestionably play a role in how people become aware of choices among options. And since subjectivity is a necessary child of autonomy certain claims of truth are made based on identity and of moral reasoning which are both plural by liberal nature. To these problems, Kwame Anthony Appiah suggests that a compromise should at least be considered. He states that when identity claims are at stake, parents are permitted to insist that their children not be taught what is contrary to their beliefs and in turn the state insists that the child be told what others believe in the name of a desire for the sort of mutual knowledge across identities that is a condition for living productively together.
Friday, July 25, 2008
Thursday, June 12, 2008
History, blood, and war
Whoever believes that history is solely an academic enterprise—one conducted for scholastic exercise or personal pleasure without relevance to our contemporary lives—might want to take time to read the Supreme Court’s monumental decision released today in Boumediene v. Bush. It is yet another 5-4 decision by the Roberts Court, one in which the crucial swing belonged yet again to Justice Kennedy. Contrary to expectation, the Court swung away from the hard right philosophy of Scalia and Roberts and confirmed the sanctity of habeas corpus against congressional interference. But perhaps most surprising about the decision is not the jurisprudential victory of the liberal wing, but rather the crucial importance of historical narrative in both the opinion of the court and the major dissenting opinion. It is testament to the importance and power of history as a legitimating force.
Although complicated, the facts leading to Boumediene v. Bush may be somewhat succinctly stated. The 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) passed by Congress in the wake of the September 11 attacks gave President Bush authority to seek retribution on Afghanistan’s Taliban-led government. In the subsequent war, prisoners were kept in Afghanistan prisons or shipped to the American Naval Station at Guantanamo Bay. These prisoners of war were styled “enemy combatants,” a status crafted by the executive branch to bolster claims that the POWs were not to be granted any of the rights determined by the Geneva Conventions. The Supreme Court ruled in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (2005) that this situation was intolerable, and that the executive branch could not make such a determination by itself. Congress responded with the Military Commissions Act (MCA) of 2006, which (along with providing legislative backing to the executive branch’s military commissions) stripped federal courts of habeas corpus jurisdiction.
So, when several detainees petitioned for writs of habeas corpus, Boumediene among them, the D.C. Court of Appeals dismissed the petitions because Congress had stripped the court of its jurisdiction. It was precisely this issue that came before the U.S. Supreme Court in Boumediene v. Bush. And the Supreme Court’s firm answer (if predicated on a very slim majority) is that habeas corpus is a judicial power that Congress cannot suspend unless within the bounds of the Constitution.
Although the opinions are awash in technical legal argument, both the opinion of the court and the dissenters rely on competing historical narratives. Justice Kennedy, both the swingman and the author of the majority opinion, constructed a sweeping historical narrative of the writ of habeas corpus that spans eight centuries. Relying on the amicus brief filed by legal historians, Kennedy described the principle of habeas corpus as originating on the field at Runnymede in 1215, of growing up in tandem with the king’s power in the fourteenth century, and emerging in the seventeenth as a judicial check on the absolutist pretensions of the Stuart monarchs. The various political and military conflicts between king and parliament in the seventeenth century are cast by Kennedy as crucial in the development of habeas corpus as a check against arbitrary power. The victory of parliamentary forces and the constitutional settlement of 1689 reaffirmed the common law rights of trial by jury and habeas corpus and created a lasting tradition for Anglo-Saxon constitutionalism in the face of arbitrary power. American patriots breathed this same rhetoric in the Revolutionary period a century later, and insured in their Constitution that neither Congress nor the executive could suspend habeas corpus except in very clear cases (rebellion or invasion).
Kennedy’s narrative is generally correct, even if it lacks a certain amount of historical sophistication. It is right where it matters most—for instance, in identifying the writ of habeas corpus’s change from a prerogative writ concerned with power (and solidifying the king’s power in the fourteenth century) to one concerned with liberty in the seventeenth century. And Kennedy’s narrative is aspirational, one that recognizes the substance of American revolutionaries’ very real commitment to liberty and their desire that the Constitution be interpreted in this way.
Compare this with the narrative sketched by Antonin Scalia. To quote from his dissenting opinion: “America is at war with radical Islamists.” This is a war he traces back to 1983 and the bombing of the Marine barracks in Lebanon that killed 241 American soldiers and which moves
to American soil in 2001. The enemy (always referred to by Scalia in the singular) “has threatened further attacks against our homeland.” He adds that one need only to “board a plane anywhere in the country, to know that the threat is a serious one.” We have sent our armed forces “against the enemy, in Afghanistan and Iraq.” For Scalia, the decision reached by the Supreme Court today “will make the war harder on us. It will almost certainly cause more Americans to be killed.”
This is Scalia’s narrative—blood, war, and executive power. Accusing the Court of playing a “bait-and-switch” game with the president, he has linked the judicial check to a war apparently begun in 1983 in Lebanon and which has presumably a beginning, middle, and (eventually) an end. But the ambiguities and distortions that lurk behind Scalia’s ham-fisted history belie his argument. Hezbollah (the perpetrators of the 1983 attack on the U.S. Marines barracks) and Al Qaeda are two very different organizations that come from rival Muslim sects. They do not cooperate. Linking such attacks on U.S. troops abroad is at best a callous display of ignorance. At worst it is intellectually dishonest. At the very least, his refusal to consider the civilian casualty count in the Middle East—those who have born the brunt of our war on terror as well as the brunt of terrorist attacks. Such facts are apparently nuisances to Scalia. So much the worse for historical truth.
Nonetheless, Scalia’s positioning of historical narrative before legal argument in his dissent is an indication of just how important historical narrative is. Why else would he begin his dissent with such a narrative? His legal analysis is formal and chilly, and it fails to persuade in the face of basic constitutional principles, let alone the litany of human rights abuses that we are perpetrating in an attempt to “protect” us. Scalia must know this, otherwise he would not need to justify his legal reasoning with an historical narrative that places Boumediene v. Bush into the context of a perpetual war (a war going on 25 years long, if Scalia’s narrative is accepted). Only then can the government’s extreme action of suspending habeas corpus and trying foreign nationals by military commission make sense. But the colossal failure of his historical narrative intellectually and morally indicates that not all narratives are equal. And our ability to receive them critically and to reject them when they fail is a key component in the survival of constitutional democracy.
Although complicated, the facts leading to Boumediene v. Bush may be somewhat succinctly stated. The 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) passed by Congress in the wake of the September 11 attacks gave President Bush authority to seek retribution on Afghanistan’s Taliban-led government. In the subsequent war, prisoners were kept in Afghanistan prisons or shipped to the American Naval Station at Guantanamo Bay. These prisoners of war were styled “enemy combatants,” a status crafted by the executive branch to bolster claims that the POWs were not to be granted any of the rights determined by the Geneva Conventions. The Supreme Court ruled in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (2005) that this situation was intolerable, and that the executive branch could not make such a determination by itself. Congress responded with the Military Commissions Act (MCA) of 2006, which (along with providing legislative backing to the executive branch’s military commissions) stripped federal courts of habeas corpus jurisdiction.
So, when several detainees petitioned for writs of habeas corpus, Boumediene among them, the D.C. Court of Appeals dismissed the petitions because Congress had stripped the court of its jurisdiction. It was precisely this issue that came before the U.S. Supreme Court in Boumediene v. Bush. And the Supreme Court’s firm answer (if predicated on a very slim majority) is that habeas corpus is a judicial power that Congress cannot suspend unless within the bounds of the Constitution.
Although the opinions are awash in technical legal argument, both the opinion of the court and the dissenters rely on competing historical narratives. Justice Kennedy, both the swingman and the author of the majority opinion, constructed a sweeping historical narrative of the writ of habeas corpus that spans eight centuries. Relying on the amicus brief filed by legal historians, Kennedy described the principle of habeas corpus as originating on the field at Runnymede in 1215, of growing up in tandem with the king’s power in the fourteenth century, and emerging in the seventeenth as a judicial check on the absolutist pretensions of the Stuart monarchs. The various political and military conflicts between king and parliament in the seventeenth century are cast by Kennedy as crucial in the development of habeas corpus as a check against arbitrary power. The victory of parliamentary forces and the constitutional settlement of 1689 reaffirmed the common law rights of trial by jury and habeas corpus and created a lasting tradition for Anglo-Saxon constitutionalism in the face of arbitrary power. American patriots breathed this same rhetoric in the Revolutionary period a century later, and insured in their Constitution that neither Congress nor the executive could suspend habeas corpus except in very clear cases (rebellion or invasion).
Kennedy’s narrative is generally correct, even if it lacks a certain amount of historical sophistication. It is right where it matters most—for instance, in identifying the writ of habeas corpus’s change from a prerogative writ concerned with power (and solidifying the king’s power in the fourteenth century) to one concerned with liberty in the seventeenth century. And Kennedy’s narrative is aspirational, one that recognizes the substance of American revolutionaries’ very real commitment to liberty and their desire that the Constitution be interpreted in this way.
Compare this with the narrative sketched by Antonin Scalia. To quote from his dissenting opinion: “America is at war with radical Islamists.” This is a war he traces back to 1983 and the bombing of the Marine barracks in Lebanon that killed 241 American soldiers and which moves
to American soil in 2001. The enemy (always referred to by Scalia in the singular) “has threatened further attacks against our homeland.” He adds that one need only to “board a plane anywhere in the country, to know that the threat is a serious one.” We have sent our armed forces “against the enemy, in Afghanistan and Iraq.” For Scalia, the decision reached by the Supreme Court today “will make the war harder on us. It will almost certainly cause more Americans to be killed.”This is Scalia’s narrative—blood, war, and executive power. Accusing the Court of playing a “bait-and-switch” game with the president, he has linked the judicial check to a war apparently begun in 1983 in Lebanon and which has presumably a beginning, middle, and (eventually) an end. But the ambiguities and distortions that lurk behind Scalia’s ham-fisted history belie his argument. Hezbollah (the perpetrators of the 1983 attack on the U.S. Marines barracks) and Al Qaeda are two very different organizations that come from rival Muslim sects. They do not cooperate. Linking such attacks on U.S. troops abroad is at best a callous display of ignorance. At worst it is intellectually dishonest. At the very least, his refusal to consider the civilian casualty count in the Middle East—those who have born the brunt of our war on terror as well as the brunt of terrorist attacks. Such facts are apparently nuisances to Scalia. So much the worse for historical truth.
Nonetheless, Scalia’s positioning of historical narrative before legal argument in his dissent is an indication of just how important historical narrative is. Why else would he begin his dissent with such a narrative? His legal analysis is formal and chilly, and it fails to persuade in the face of basic constitutional principles, let alone the litany of human rights abuses that we are perpetrating in an attempt to “protect” us. Scalia must know this, otherwise he would not need to justify his legal reasoning with an historical narrative that places Boumediene v. Bush into the context of a perpetual war (a war going on 25 years long, if Scalia’s narrative is accepted). Only then can the government’s extreme action of suspending habeas corpus and trying foreign nationals by military commission make sense. But the colossal failure of his historical narrative intellectually and morally indicates that not all narratives are equal. And our ability to receive them critically and to reject them when they fail is a key component in the survival of constitutional democracy.
Thursday, May 29, 2008
Fairness, Foulness, the Formalist/Realist Split and the . . . NBA
Was it a foul? With two seconds and change on the clock Tuesday night last, the San Antonio Spurs had one shot to tie the game or go ahead on an upcourt inbounds. The ball ended up in Brent Barry's hands, he attempted a pass, pulled up and--after getting L.A. Lakers' guard Derek Fisher into the air, drew contact and heaved up a three point prayer that went nowhere near the basket.
Was it a foul? Fish clearly bumped Barry on the shooting arm while he was in the process of trying to dribble out of coverage to either make the pass or put up a three. But not only was there no whistle, but not even the Spurs afterwards said a foul should have been called. If Brent Barry--who initially threw up his hands in frustration--says there was no foul, why should we think there was one? Perhaps because the league office has now reviewed the play and said there should have been a foul called.
There are four major arguments at play in the ongoing debate on whether the Lakers escaped fate on Tuesday. Interestingly, these arguments parallel problems faced by judges when tricky issues come before them. Briefly, here are the arguments:
1) It WAS a foul. A defensive player who has left his feet is out of position, Fisher had done so, collided with Barry, and it would be a foul at any time during the game. The game should be refereed the same from minute one to minute forty-eight.
2) NO foul. In a last possession play at the end of a game (especially one so momentous) shooters shoot and defenders defend and the players, not the referees, will decide the game.
3) FOUL, but it would be FOUL TO CALL IT. The Lakers had just lost possession on the other end because of a miss-call by the referees. This occurred when a shot by Fisher glanced off the rim, but the shot clock was not reset. Thus, advantage Spurs. Now, at the other end, a non-call on the foul makes it even (rather than giving the advantage to the Lakers).
4) It's BARRY'S FAULT. Brent Barry didn't sell the foul. If he sold the foul, he would have got the call. But he didn't. Barry's problem.
We can find in these arguments major schools of adjudication, believe it or not. Position 1 is akin to FORMALISM. A foul is a foul, no matter where it occurs. The rulebook tells you what a foul is. It's akin to stepping out of bounds. If a player steps out of bounds, then he turns the ball over. Doesn't matter when it happens.
Position 2 is the REALIST response to formalists. Of course rules are rules, say the realists, but the truth of the matter is that they are applied subjectively and within other, informal rules. For instance, everyone knows that superstars get calls that role players don't. And everyone knows that in the final seconds of the game, you don't try to draw offensive or defensive fouls because the referees will let you play. Few Bulls fans (or Jazz fans, for that matter) will forget Michael Jordan's famous shot in game six of the 1998 Finals (Bulls led the series 3-2 at that point). Down 85-86, Jordan cleared Byron Russell out of his way before taking the shot that put the Bulls ahead. Should a foul have been called? No, say the realists. Do we want our memory of NBA great games to be people standing on the line shooting free throws to end a game, or letting people put up shots and live or die in the moment? Let's be real.
Positions 3 and 4 are both outliers to the formalist/realist debate suggesting ways in which real circumstances mitigate the absolute rules. Position 3 takes an EQUITABLE approach. Make up calls are, after all, a part of any sport, and moreso for basketball where fouls are acknowledged as the most subjective part of refereeing. Position 4 is something akin to blame the victim. The real point, though, is not that Barry should be criticized for not "selling" the foul, but rather that if Barry had gone tumbling head over toe and lost the ball out of bounds after Fish bumped him, the referees would have had no choice but to call the foul (or, at least, it would be harder for them to ignore it).
Being more a realist than a formalist, I think the refs got it right. And I don't think the Spurs are served well by the league patting them on the shoulder and saying "sorry, guys, Barry should have been on the line to send the game into overtime." The Spurs evidently don't either, but they may just be keeping a good face. No one wants to be seen as a whiner. And, regardless of what OUGHT to have happened, what IS happening is that the Spurs have to win three in a row, with or without the benefit of good calls, informal rules, and all that jazz.
Was it a foul? Fish clearly bumped Barry on the shooting arm while he was in the process of trying to dribble out of coverage to either make the pass or put up a three. But not only was there no whistle, but not even the Spurs afterwards said a foul should have been called. If Brent Barry--who initially threw up his hands in frustration--says there was no foul, why should we think there was one? Perhaps because the league office has now reviewed the play and said there should have been a foul called.There are four major arguments at play in the ongoing debate on whether the Lakers escaped fate on Tuesday. Interestingly, these arguments parallel problems faced by judges when tricky issues come before them. Briefly, here are the arguments:
1) It WAS a foul. A defensive player who has left his feet is out of position, Fisher had done so, collided with Barry, and it would be a foul at any time during the game. The game should be refereed the same from minute one to minute forty-eight.
2) NO foul. In a last possession play at the end of a game (especially one so momentous) shooters shoot and defenders defend and the players, not the referees, will decide the game.
3) FOUL, but it would be FOUL TO CALL IT. The Lakers had just lost possession on the other end because of a miss-call by the referees. This occurred when a shot by Fisher glanced off the rim, but the shot clock was not reset. Thus, advantage Spurs. Now, at the other end, a non-call on the foul makes it even (rather than giving the advantage to the Lakers).
4) It's BARRY'S FAULT. Brent Barry didn't sell the foul. If he sold the foul, he would have got the call. But he didn't. Barry's problem.
We can find in these arguments major schools of adjudication, believe it or not. Position 1 is akin to FORMALISM. A foul is a foul, no matter where it occurs. The rulebook tells you what a foul is. It's akin to stepping out of bounds. If a player steps out of bounds, then he turns the ball over. Doesn't matter when it happens.
Position 2 is the REALIST response to formalists. Of course rules are rules, say the realists, but the truth of the matter is that they are applied subjectively and within other, informal rules. For instance, everyone knows that superstars get calls that role players don't. And everyone knows that in the final seconds of the game, you don't try to draw offensive or defensive fouls because the referees will let you play. Few Bulls fans (or Jazz fans, for that matter) will forget Michael Jordan's famous shot in game six of the 1998 Finals (Bulls led the series 3-2 at that point). Down 85-86, Jordan cleared Byron Russell out of his way before taking the shot that put the Bulls ahead. Should a foul have been called? No, say the realists. Do we want our memory of NBA great games to be people standing on the line shooting free throws to end a game, or letting people put up shots and live or die in the moment? Let's be real.
Positions 3 and 4 are both outliers to the formalist/realist debate suggesting ways in which real circumstances mitigate the absolute rules. Position 3 takes an EQUITABLE approach. Make up calls are, after all, a part of any sport, and moreso for basketball where fouls are acknowledged as the most subjective part of refereeing. Position 4 is something akin to blame the victim. The real point, though, is not that Barry should be criticized for not "selling" the foul, but rather that if Barry had gone tumbling head over toe and lost the ball out of bounds after Fish bumped him, the referees would have had no choice but to call the foul (or, at least, it would be harder for them to ignore it).
Being more a realist than a formalist, I think the refs got it right. And I don't think the Spurs are served well by the league patting them on the shoulder and saying "sorry, guys, Barry should have been on the line to send the game into overtime." The Spurs evidently don't either, but they may just be keeping a good face. No one wants to be seen as a whiner. And, regardless of what OUGHT to have happened, what IS happening is that the Spurs have to win three in a row, with or without the benefit of good calls, informal rules, and all that jazz.
Wednesday, May 28, 2008
The Ethics of Tolerance
I. Hume’s Problem (Now Sen. Clinton’s): The Is/Ought Problem
No doubt that many have heard the recent comments Sen. Clinton made connecting the length of the Democratic Primaries, former pres. Clinton, and the assassination of Robert Kennedy to the month of June. The general argument Sen. Clinton attempted to make was that compared to previous democratic primaries, the contest we are all witnessing is not as long. This is not quite true. By June of 1992, former pres. Clinton did get the nomination, but (this is according to Tim Russert and others) in the six weeks prior to, a vast majority in the Democratic Party were ceding the nomination to him simply because he had a massive delegate lead insurmountable by the upcoming contests. In June of 1968, Robert Kennedy was not in the same position as former pres. Clinton to clinch the nomination. He was actually looking forward to going to Chicago and focusing on later primaries, and we all know what tragically happened next.
What is troubling about Sen. Clinton’s premises is at least threefold:
1. The way Sen. Clinton juxtaposed her reasoning for continuing on was, arguably, rather parsimonious.
2. The facts of the events Sen. Clinton cited were not fully articulated.
3. Referencing Robert Kennedy in June of 1968, and particularly only mentioning his assassination which Sen. Clinton did, as rationale, neglects America’s original political sin and arguably takes a matter of instantiated historical fact and sentiment and attempts to place it in an objective realm of reason.
The basis of premise three is perhaps most important because it references an age-old philosophical problem that poked at David Hume for quite some time. The question, then, becomes how do you make something that “is” what “ought” to be? In other words, how does/can the instantiated fact of Robert Kennedy’s assassination (the ‘is’), become part of the acceptable rationale to Sen. Clinton continuing her campaign (a rationale for what ‘ought’ to be a reason for her continued campaign)? Perhaps such an argument could be better held in favor of Sen. Clinton if she would have considered premise two more properly. For our discussion though, we shall move on the words that were spoken.
II. The Vagueness of Identity
I’ve spoken to about a handful of people about this matter; all varying in age, ethnicity, class, and training. And though it is difficult to place the thoughts and feelings of a few as complete and total rationales, I did notice connections between the opinions in conversations held and certain views of identity my friends have about themselves. Perhaps these views on identity could be used as a connective tool to interpret why varied opinions were held on this issue and just what could be done with those sentiments to not further any divides. Anyhow, concerning identity, there appears at least thus far in my studies two prisms which it can be shaped. One concerns the picture of romanticism—the idea of “finding,” or “authenticating” oneself. The other suggests a more existentialist picture (shout out to John Paul Sartre)—the doctrine of “existence precedes essence”: meaning that one exists first and has to decide what exactly to exist as. In other words, we have certain materials available to us as far as identity goes. We then have to sift through the material and construct ourselves.
A middle view could be argued, as Kwame Anthony Appiah does that self-authorship is a good thing, but that authored identity must make some sense. And for that to happen, that identity must be constructed in response to facts outside oneself. These three positions could be further elucidated if we consider the period after the Civil War and more particularly what are known as the “Civil War Amendments.” We could make the argument that the 13th, 14th, and 15th amendments gave former slaves new “materials” (even though they faced a rather austere American society—which is an issue of sociability) to construct identities with—to give them an essence consisting of citizenship, due process, etc. In the passing of these amendments, those in congress had the opportunity and venues to not only exercise a sense of moral justice, but to “authenticate“ the ideals of America. The middle view would suggest that both extremes essentially came together to make sense for all involved and are constructed in response to certain facts (the Constitution, Declaration of Independence, The Bill of Rights or the very amendments themselves). So how does this relate to how we respond to Sen. Clinton?
I argue, especially given the historical connections of the assassination of popular political leaders such as Robert Kennedy, Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. and Malcolm X, The nature of Sen. Obama being in a position to win the Democratic Party nomination and his being a popular political leader, and those who gravitate either by inclination or generous thought to either of the mentioned venues of identity, could arrive at varied interpretations of Sen. Clinton’s words. Interpretations which arguably include the understanding of the other views based on the roads of identity we’ve discussed which implies a notion of toleration for those that oppose one that someone may hold.
III. The Difficulty of Tolerance
With all we’ve discussed, it may seem more acceptable (I would hope so at least) that we may understand why it is that differences of opinion occur among people that come across the same thing or hear the same words. Outside logical connections and philosophical inquiry, resulting explanations and perhaps larger elements of truth are assaulted by unclear biases and peculiar norms. Bias is unfortunately real and so are the social norms that can emerge from them. It was on this notion that Victor Hugo rather accurately wrote “The human soul has still greater need of the ideal than of the real. It is by the real that we exist; it is by the ideal that we live” in his famous Hunchback of Notre Dame. So why then do we or should we value tolerance—especially since it can further another’s biases and make what is rather false very real? Harvard’s T.M. Scanlon argues that tolerance allows for a relation with one’s fellow citizens. Whether this relation is positive or abortive is still unclear, but in evaluating comments like the ones made my Sen. Clinton, one should perhaps realize that they are not made in objective vacuums and are attributable to not only goal-oriented biases and the training of authenticated or authored identity (or a mixture of the two), but are curiously enough, evaluated by the same means.
Dum vivimus, vivamus.
No doubt that many have heard the recent comments Sen. Clinton made connecting the length of the Democratic Primaries, former pres. Clinton, and the assassination of Robert Kennedy to the month of June. The general argument Sen. Clinton attempted to make was that compared to previous democratic primaries, the contest we are all witnessing is not as long. This is not quite true. By June of 1992, former pres. Clinton did get the nomination, but (this is according to Tim Russert and others) in the six weeks prior to, a vast majority in the Democratic Party were ceding the nomination to him simply because he had a massive delegate lead insurmountable by the upcoming contests. In June of 1968, Robert Kennedy was not in the same position as former pres. Clinton to clinch the nomination. He was actually looking forward to going to Chicago and focusing on later primaries, and we all know what tragically happened next.
What is troubling about Sen. Clinton’s premises is at least threefold:
1. The way Sen. Clinton juxtaposed her reasoning for continuing on was, arguably, rather parsimonious.
2. The facts of the events Sen. Clinton cited were not fully articulated.
3. Referencing Robert Kennedy in June of 1968, and particularly only mentioning his assassination which Sen. Clinton did, as rationale, neglects America’s original political sin and arguably takes a matter of instantiated historical fact and sentiment and attempts to place it in an objective realm of reason.
The basis of premise three is perhaps most important because it references an age-old philosophical problem that poked at David Hume for quite some time. The question, then, becomes how do you make something that “is” what “ought” to be? In other words, how does/can the instantiated fact of Robert Kennedy’s assassination (the ‘is’), become part of the acceptable rationale to Sen. Clinton continuing her campaign (a rationale for what ‘ought’ to be a reason for her continued campaign)? Perhaps such an argument could be better held in favor of Sen. Clinton if she would have considered premise two more properly. For our discussion though, we shall move on the words that were spoken.
II. The Vagueness of Identity
I’ve spoken to about a handful of people about this matter; all varying in age, ethnicity, class, and training. And though it is difficult to place the thoughts and feelings of a few as complete and total rationales, I did notice connections between the opinions in conversations held and certain views of identity my friends have about themselves. Perhaps these views on identity could be used as a connective tool to interpret why varied opinions were held on this issue and just what could be done with those sentiments to not further any divides. Anyhow, concerning identity, there appears at least thus far in my studies two prisms which it can be shaped. One concerns the picture of romanticism—the idea of “finding,” or “authenticating” oneself. The other suggests a more existentialist picture (shout out to John Paul Sartre)—the doctrine of “existence precedes essence”: meaning that one exists first and has to decide what exactly to exist as. In other words, we have certain materials available to us as far as identity goes. We then have to sift through the material and construct ourselves.
A middle view could be argued, as Kwame Anthony Appiah does that self-authorship is a good thing, but that authored identity must make some sense. And for that to happen, that identity must be constructed in response to facts outside oneself. These three positions could be further elucidated if we consider the period after the Civil War and more particularly what are known as the “Civil War Amendments.” We could make the argument that the 13th, 14th, and 15th amendments gave former slaves new “materials” (even though they faced a rather austere American society—which is an issue of sociability) to construct identities with—to give them an essence consisting of citizenship, due process, etc. In the passing of these amendments, those in congress had the opportunity and venues to not only exercise a sense of moral justice, but to “authenticate“ the ideals of America. The middle view would suggest that both extremes essentially came together to make sense for all involved and are constructed in response to certain facts (the Constitution, Declaration of Independence, The Bill of Rights or the very amendments themselves). So how does this relate to how we respond to Sen. Clinton?
I argue, especially given the historical connections of the assassination of popular political leaders such as Robert Kennedy, Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. and Malcolm X, The nature of Sen. Obama being in a position to win the Democratic Party nomination and his being a popular political leader, and those who gravitate either by inclination or generous thought to either of the mentioned venues of identity, could arrive at varied interpretations of Sen. Clinton’s words. Interpretations which arguably include the understanding of the other views based on the roads of identity we’ve discussed which implies a notion of toleration for those that oppose one that someone may hold.
III. The Difficulty of Tolerance
With all we’ve discussed, it may seem more acceptable (I would hope so at least) that we may understand why it is that differences of opinion occur among people that come across the same thing or hear the same words. Outside logical connections and philosophical inquiry, resulting explanations and perhaps larger elements of truth are assaulted by unclear biases and peculiar norms. Bias is unfortunately real and so are the social norms that can emerge from them. It was on this notion that Victor Hugo rather accurately wrote “The human soul has still greater need of the ideal than of the real. It is by the real that we exist; it is by the ideal that we live” in his famous Hunchback of Notre Dame. So why then do we or should we value tolerance—especially since it can further another’s biases and make what is rather false very real? Harvard’s T.M. Scanlon argues that tolerance allows for a relation with one’s fellow citizens. Whether this relation is positive or abortive is still unclear, but in evaluating comments like the ones made my Sen. Clinton, one should perhaps realize that they are not made in objective vacuums and are attributable to not only goal-oriented biases and the training of authenticated or authored identity (or a mixture of the two), but are curiously enough, evaluated by the same means.
Dum vivimus, vivamus.
Tuesday, April 29, 2008
A Critique of Dudziak’s Cold War Civil Rights.
Introduction.
In Cold War Civil war, Dudziak tries to account for the Civil Right Reform in post World War II America by arguing that the Cold War was a major influence of these reforms. By arguing that the Cold War indirectly led to Civil Rights reforms, Dudziak claims that her analysis is not supposed to replace, or undermine the role played by other domestic factors; however, a premise implicit in Dudziak’s historical narrative is the idea that American political motivations in domestic matters are always sensitive to America’s long-term international interest. That is on Dudziak’s view, American administrations always try to tailor their domestic policies in way that: (1) safeguard America’s image abroad and (2) help America’s international interest. This paper tries to illustrate some of the problems with Dudziak’s narrative. That is, it is not always clear that America acts in ways that are conducive for their long-term international interest. The Vietnam War is clearly an example of an instance in which America engaged in policies that directly undermined her international image as well as her long-term international interest. Even if we grant Dudziak the premise that the modus operandi of American policy is to act in ways that are beneficial to America’s long-term interest, the burden of proof will still be on Dudziak to explain-away events that do not fit her model—like the Vietnam War. The fact that America decided to invade Vietnam despite the foreseeable harm that the invasion will have on her foreign policy is a fact that anyone sympathetic to Dudziak’s argument must explain.
Setting up the Stage: Civil Rights Reform and the Cold War.
In his seminal 1946 speech Winston Churchill proclaims the beginning of what is now called the Cold War with the following word, “[f]rom Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic an Iron curtain has descended across the World”(Modern History sourcebook). The Cold War will last from Churchill’s speech to the fall of the Berlin War in November of 1989 and during this period tensions between the communist nations led by Russia and capitalist/democratic regimes of the west almost led the world to a full blown nuclear war— like in the Bay of Pigs Affair. In Cold War Civil Rights, Dudziak explore the influences of the Cold War on Civil Rights reform by suggesting that “[t]he need to address international criticism[ about the inadequacies of American democracy] gave the federal government an incentive to promote social change at home”(Dudziak, p.12). Implicit in Dudziak’s arguments is something like the following model:
Domestic event + international pressure = reform; where reform is amenable to international pressure (my formalization of Dudziak’s argument)[1]
i) Dudziak’s Model at work in cold war civil war.
In Cold War Civil war Dudziak’s presents her argument according to the model outlined above that is, first she presents a domestic event and then she present the international reaction to the event and finally she shows how the international pressure forced the government to undertake social reforms that always accommodated the critics of America. To see Dudziak’s model at work consider the following domestic event: The 1946, lynching of Blacks in the south. This event was criticized by the Fiji time and China tribune reports and ultimately President Truman meet NAACP and promises to pass civil rights reform — a move that ultimately split the DNC, as the Southerners created the States’ Rights Party and choose Strum Thurman as their candidate. Similarly she argues that in McLaurin v. Oklahoma (1948), the Supreme Court warned the state attorney general that “these kind of segregation affected America image abroad” (Dudziak, p.98-99). To further illustration the effectiveness of Dudziak’s model, consider the 1958 incidence involving Jimmy Wilson a handyman from Alabama given the death sentence for stealing less than a dollar in change. The international pressure surrounding this event came from the following sources:
1) Canadian judges wrote a petition to the Governor of Alabama, James Folsom
2) Italian newspaper L’UNITA called it “a new unprecedented low in American segregation”
3) Hulda Omreit a Housewife from Norway wrote a petition to the Governor of Alabama (Dudziak).
Dudziak goes on to argue that it was as a result of the international pressure that the governor of Alabama James Folsom was forced to grant Wilson Clemency. Similarly she argues that in 1961 Kennedy’s active involvement in African matters such as the independence of Algeria, was largely an attempt to improve American bilateral relationships with Africa in the aftermath of an incident surrounding the newly appointed Ambassador of Chad Malick Sow. (Dudziak, p.153). So far I have showed how Dudziak argues for her thesis that international pressure played a crucial role in bringing about
Civil Rights reform in America during the Cold War. What follows provide evidence in support of my argument that Dudziak’s model of explanation breaks down, because it cannot be used to explain American policies in other Cold War events like the Vietnam War.
The Nature of the American Political Motivation and the change it produces.
Historically American has never been known as a country that yields to international pressure contrary to what Dudziak want us to belief. Although Dudziak gives compelling reason to explain why the Cold War played a major role in bringing about Civil Rights reform, it seems as thought her argument rely on the premise that American domestic policies are highly influenced by international pressure. However, the claim that U.S. domestic politics is sensitive to international pressure could not be established by fiat, nor could it be established by looking at a couple of historical events during the Cold war. Rather, one needs to examine other historical events in order to establish that as a general principles America would always engage in the course of action that is most suitable to her international interest. That is, Dudziak’s thesis will loose its intuitive appeal if further analysis of the Cold War reveals evidence suggesting that America made decision that undermined her long-term geopolitical interest. That is, if one could successfully show that in at least one instances American has made political decisions that jeopardizes their foreign politics then Dudziak would have to show why her theory for explaining American political motivation works for only a carefully selected set of events but fails to account or other event.
The Vietnam War is used in this paper to show contra Dudziak that, American often takes decisions which are contrary to her long-term international interest even in light of international pressure. In June of 1965, USIA Director Carl Rowan’s daily briefing suggested that “[i]ncreasing U.S. involvement in Vietnam brings growing editorial concern and divided opinion, some of it strongly critical” (National security Files, Kennedy library). The Johnson Administration’s increased its involvement in Vietnam despite the fact that America’s daily involvement in Vietnam threatened to undermine domestic Civil Rights reform. According to Dudziak’s model, one would have expected the Johnson Administration to withdraw from Vietnam due to growing international pressure along with the domestic unrest brought by the war. Thus, despite its initial appeal Dudziak’s model for understanding the motivations of American policies is far too simplistic. The problem seems to be that Dudziak fails to appreciate all the complexities underlying the political motivations of any government. As a result one gets a very static and monolithic view if U.S. political motivation.
One could object to my criticism of Cold War Civil Right, by arguing that Dudziak is not making any normative claims about American political motivation and that she is simple giving a descriptive account of historic events. I response to this objection to my critique of Dudziak by arguing that there is no such thing as “ purely descriptive claim,” because descriptive claims always entail normative implication. That is, by describing how subsequent U.S. administrations responded to international pressure, Dudziak is ultimately claiming that American policy is sensitive to international pressure as a matter of fact. Unfortunately we have found at least one instance (i.e. the Vietnam War) in which American policy did not show this sensitivity to international pressure. So the burden of proof is on Dudziak to explain why her model is not successful in explaining U.S. political motivations in Vietnam.
References
1) Dudziak L.Mary, “Cold War Civil War”
2) Kennedy Library online at http://www.jfklibrary.org/
3) Modern History sourcebook online at http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/modsbook.html
[1] Note that Dudziak presents no formal argument in her book so this formal rendition of her argument is my attempt to clearly articulation some of her unstated premises. This is, her historical narrative operates under a certain model according to which domestic events plus international pressure always led to a social reform; whereby, the reforms were always meant to silence international critics of America. In what follows I will illustrate how Dudziak makes use of this model to advance her thesis by showing how the model works in a good number of domestic events that took place during the cold war. However I will show how the model breaks down when applied to the war in Vietnam.
In Cold War Civil war, Dudziak tries to account for the Civil Right Reform in post World War II America by arguing that the Cold War was a major influence of these reforms. By arguing that the Cold War indirectly led to Civil Rights reforms, Dudziak claims that her analysis is not supposed to replace, or undermine the role played by other domestic factors; however, a premise implicit in Dudziak’s historical narrative is the idea that American political motivations in domestic matters are always sensitive to America’s long-term international interest. That is on Dudziak’s view, American administrations always try to tailor their domestic policies in way that: (1) safeguard America’s image abroad and (2) help America’s international interest. This paper tries to illustrate some of the problems with Dudziak’s narrative. That is, it is not always clear that America acts in ways that are conducive for their long-term international interest. The Vietnam War is clearly an example of an instance in which America engaged in policies that directly undermined her international image as well as her long-term international interest. Even if we grant Dudziak the premise that the modus operandi of American policy is to act in ways that are beneficial to America’s long-term interest, the burden of proof will still be on Dudziak to explain-away events that do not fit her model—like the Vietnam War. The fact that America decided to invade Vietnam despite the foreseeable harm that the invasion will have on her foreign policy is a fact that anyone sympathetic to Dudziak’s argument must explain.
Setting up the Stage: Civil Rights Reform and the Cold War.
In his seminal 1946 speech Winston Churchill proclaims the beginning of what is now called the Cold War with the following word, “[f]rom Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic an Iron curtain has descended across the World”(Modern History sourcebook). The Cold War will last from Churchill’s speech to the fall of the Berlin War in November of 1989 and during this period tensions between the communist nations led by Russia and capitalist/democratic regimes of the west almost led the world to a full blown nuclear war— like in the Bay of Pigs Affair. In Cold War Civil Rights, Dudziak explore the influences of the Cold War on Civil Rights reform by suggesting that “[t]he need to address international criticism[ about the inadequacies of American democracy] gave the federal government an incentive to promote social change at home”(Dudziak, p.12). Implicit in Dudziak’s arguments is something like the following model:
Domestic event + international pressure = reform; where reform is amenable to international pressure (my formalization of Dudziak’s argument)[1]
i) Dudziak’s Model at work in cold war civil war.
In Cold War Civil war Dudziak’s presents her argument according to the model outlined above that is, first she presents a domestic event and then she present the international reaction to the event and finally she shows how the international pressure forced the government to undertake social reforms that always accommodated the critics of America. To see Dudziak’s model at work consider the following domestic event: The 1946, lynching of Blacks in the south. This event was criticized by the Fiji time and China tribune reports and ultimately President Truman meet NAACP and promises to pass civil rights reform — a move that ultimately split the DNC, as the Southerners created the States’ Rights Party and choose Strum Thurman as their candidate. Similarly she argues that in McLaurin v. Oklahoma (1948), the Supreme Court warned the state attorney general that “these kind of segregation affected America image abroad” (Dudziak, p.98-99). To further illustration the effectiveness of Dudziak’s model, consider the 1958 incidence involving Jimmy Wilson a handyman from Alabama given the death sentence for stealing less than a dollar in change. The international pressure surrounding this event came from the following sources:
1) Canadian judges wrote a petition to the Governor of Alabama, James Folsom
2) Italian newspaper L’UNITA called it “a new unprecedented low in American segregation”
3) Hulda Omreit a Housewife from Norway wrote a petition to the Governor of Alabama (Dudziak).
Dudziak goes on to argue that it was as a result of the international pressure that the governor of Alabama James Folsom was forced to grant Wilson Clemency. Similarly she argues that in 1961 Kennedy’s active involvement in African matters such as the independence of Algeria, was largely an attempt to improve American bilateral relationships with Africa in the aftermath of an incident surrounding the newly appointed Ambassador of Chad Malick Sow. (Dudziak, p.153). So far I have showed how Dudziak argues for her thesis that international pressure played a crucial role in bringing about
Civil Rights reform in America during the Cold War. What follows provide evidence in support of my argument that Dudziak’s model of explanation breaks down, because it cannot be used to explain American policies in other Cold War events like the Vietnam War.
The Nature of the American Political Motivation and the change it produces.
Historically American has never been known as a country that yields to international pressure contrary to what Dudziak want us to belief. Although Dudziak gives compelling reason to explain why the Cold War played a major role in bringing about Civil Rights reform, it seems as thought her argument rely on the premise that American domestic policies are highly influenced by international pressure. However, the claim that U.S. domestic politics is sensitive to international pressure could not be established by fiat, nor could it be established by looking at a couple of historical events during the Cold war. Rather, one needs to examine other historical events in order to establish that as a general principles America would always engage in the course of action that is most suitable to her international interest. That is, Dudziak’s thesis will loose its intuitive appeal if further analysis of the Cold War reveals evidence suggesting that America made decision that undermined her long-term geopolitical interest. That is, if one could successfully show that in at least one instances American has made political decisions that jeopardizes their foreign politics then Dudziak would have to show why her theory for explaining American political motivation works for only a carefully selected set of events but fails to account or other event.
The Vietnam War is used in this paper to show contra Dudziak that, American often takes decisions which are contrary to her long-term international interest even in light of international pressure. In June of 1965, USIA Director Carl Rowan’s daily briefing suggested that “[i]ncreasing U.S. involvement in Vietnam brings growing editorial concern and divided opinion, some of it strongly critical” (National security Files, Kennedy library). The Johnson Administration’s increased its involvement in Vietnam despite the fact that America’s daily involvement in Vietnam threatened to undermine domestic Civil Rights reform. According to Dudziak’s model, one would have expected the Johnson Administration to withdraw from Vietnam due to growing international pressure along with the domestic unrest brought by the war. Thus, despite its initial appeal Dudziak’s model for understanding the motivations of American policies is far too simplistic. The problem seems to be that Dudziak fails to appreciate all the complexities underlying the political motivations of any government. As a result one gets a very static and monolithic view if U.S. political motivation.
One could object to my criticism of Cold War Civil Right, by arguing that Dudziak is not making any normative claims about American political motivation and that she is simple giving a descriptive account of historic events. I response to this objection to my critique of Dudziak by arguing that there is no such thing as “ purely descriptive claim,” because descriptive claims always entail normative implication. That is, by describing how subsequent U.S. administrations responded to international pressure, Dudziak is ultimately claiming that American policy is sensitive to international pressure as a matter of fact. Unfortunately we have found at least one instance (i.e. the Vietnam War) in which American policy did not show this sensitivity to international pressure. So the burden of proof is on Dudziak to explain why her model is not successful in explaining U.S. political motivations in Vietnam.
References
1) Dudziak L.Mary, “Cold War Civil War”
2) Kennedy Library online at http://www.jfklibrary.org/
3) Modern History sourcebook online at http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/modsbook.html
[1] Note that Dudziak presents no formal argument in her book so this formal rendition of her argument is my attempt to clearly articulation some of her unstated premises. This is, her historical narrative operates under a certain model according to which domestic events plus international pressure always led to a social reform; whereby, the reforms were always meant to silence international critics of America. In what follows I will illustrate how Dudziak makes use of this model to advance her thesis by showing how the model works in a good number of domestic events that took place during the cold war. However I will show how the model breaks down when applied to the war in Vietnam.
Thursday, April 24, 2008
Point of view for the ladies dealing with abortion rights
I was surfing on the internet today and came across an article saying that Chief Justice Scalia talked to "60 Minutes" recently and said that he felt the Constitution didn't prohibit abortion any more than it allowed it, and that he doesn't agree with conservatives who say the Constitution means that the states should prohibit abortions. Not sure if it'll help with your research but it is at least perhaps a different point of view on the subject for your own personal knowledge on his reasoning, being a SC Justice. Unfortunately, I did see that it doesn't air until Sunday, but you might be able to look at a transcript or something online. Good luck.
Tuesday, April 22, 2008
Equal Protection Clause and Women's Rights
For my research, im looking at the equal protections clause and how it changed from disallowing women to benefit from its protections in the late 19th century to concluding the exact opposite in 1971.
First of all, it is embarrassing to admit that I knew absolutely nothing about this crucial part of the Constitution before this paper. I didn’t even know where it was located or what it said. Upon a simple reading, it seems to be very straightforward in its objective. It does not cease to amaze me how it could have ever been argued that it did not apply to women, but it was, and for more than a hundred years, that is the interpretation that was generally accepted.
Although I now understand the reasoning behind how the Supreme Court managed to justify this exclusion, it is amazing to me that two such opposing sides could stem from the same short, seemingly simple text. The EPC was used in both instances to accomplish whatever means the court had in mind, in one instance to justify excluding women from possessing certain privileges and immunities and then later to decide that they do fall under the clause's protections.
I’ve been stumbling on a lot of heated feminist literature while researching for this (but not using it in my paper obviously!) so maybe im just a little bitter right now, but I don’t think women have ever been fully in control of attaining their own rights, and have been forced to rely on the whims of the Justices and whether they are up to speed with shifts in the social climate or lagging behind. The fact that there are such drastic changes in constitutional interpretation between cases, like from Plessy to Brown or Bradwell to Reed, makes it seem obvious that the Constitution really is a living Constitution and that it’s meaning changes with the times, rather than being just a flat blueprint.
These are just generalizations of course and mostly ramblings after doing research for papers for like 2 months straight, but it does all make me wonder how these decisions are being made and justified and rediscovered and justified and repealed and justified etc. Very puzzling!
First of all, it is embarrassing to admit that I knew absolutely nothing about this crucial part of the Constitution before this paper. I didn’t even know where it was located or what it said. Upon a simple reading, it seems to be very straightforward in its objective. It does not cease to amaze me how it could have ever been argued that it did not apply to women, but it was, and for more than a hundred years, that is the interpretation that was generally accepted.
Although I now understand the reasoning behind how the Supreme Court managed to justify this exclusion, it is amazing to me that two such opposing sides could stem from the same short, seemingly simple text. The EPC was used in both instances to accomplish whatever means the court had in mind, in one instance to justify excluding women from possessing certain privileges and immunities and then later to decide that they do fall under the clause's protections.
I’ve been stumbling on a lot of heated feminist literature while researching for this (but not using it in my paper obviously!) so maybe im just a little bitter right now, but I don’t think women have ever been fully in control of attaining their own rights, and have been forced to rely on the whims of the Justices and whether they are up to speed with shifts in the social climate or lagging behind. The fact that there are such drastic changes in constitutional interpretation between cases, like from Plessy to Brown or Bradwell to Reed, makes it seem obvious that the Constitution really is a living Constitution and that it’s meaning changes with the times, rather than being just a flat blueprint.
These are just generalizations of course and mostly ramblings after doing research for papers for like 2 months straight, but it does all make me wonder how these decisions are being made and justified and rediscovered and justified and repealed and justified etc. Very puzzling!
D-Republican and Bank of the United States
My research is why Democratic-Republican changed their opinion about a National Bank and accepted it. When I research this subject, I found that especially Thomas Jefferson abhorred BUS(Bank of the United States) enormously calling it "one of the most deadly hostility existing, against the principles and form of our Constitution." However, when James Madison took office in 1809, he accepted and renew the Bank of the United States in 1816 even though protracting debates were going on for 5 years.
It really seems ironical to me when James Madison actually changed his opinion about a National Bank. However, I think we need to think about "domestic situation, Constitutional debates, Public opinion, Election of 1816" so that we can figure out why James Madison made a decision.
It really seems ironical to me when James Madison actually changed his opinion about a National Bank. However, I think we need to think about "domestic situation, Constitutional debates, Public opinion, Election of 1816" so that we can figure out why James Madison made a decision.
Monday, April 21, 2008
Privileges or Immunities Clause
Does the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment incorporate the rights of citizens as listed in the bill of rights be protected from States? I am going to argue that it does based on historical evidence and the ever changing legal and scholarly interpretations of this Amendment.
In doing so, I will discuss the evolution of the "privileges or Immunities" Clause starting with what some would say is its origin in the comity clause in Article IV, Section II into what is known as the Incorporation Doctrine. I will show that the radical republicans who pushed this amendment, would at least in part support this doctrine because it was their original intent.
In doing so, I will discuss the evolution of the "privileges or Immunities" Clause starting with what some would say is its origin in the comity clause in Article IV, Section II into what is known as the Incorporation Doctrine. I will show that the radical republicans who pushed this amendment, would at least in part support this doctrine because it was their original intent.
The 18th Amendment
My topic is the 18th amendment. My question is about how our country came to the 18th amendment. I am basically finished with the research. I was disappointed that the main book I wanted to use was checked out in the library, but life goes on. I have found the topic interesting. I selected it because my grandfather was a sheriff of a rural area south of Atlanta during prohibition and I have heard stories of his "liquor still busting days." Actually he busted a high school friends grandfather - we found the old still with ax marks in it.
It is interesting that the government decided to regulate morals for the country.
It is interesting that the government decided to regulate morals for the country.
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